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The Evolution of Authorship: 
Work Made by Code* 
 
Annemarie Bridy** 
Hi, it’s great to be here.  I want to thank Jane and June for the invitation and for 
what’s turning out to be a really wonderful collection of comments and thoughts. 
When I first started thinking about the problem that computer authors might 
present for copyright law, I thought I was thinking about a uniquely twenty-first 
century problem.  As it turns out, though, computer authorship is sort of an old 
problem for copyright law, with a history that goes back to the early days of 
computing. 
In 1956, two mathematicians named Martin Klein and Douglas Bolitho 
programmed a Datatron digital computer to compose Tin Pan Alley songs.  “Last 
spring,” Dr. Klein wrote in the June 1957 issue of Radio Electronics Magazine, 
“we set out to prove that if human beings could write popular music of poor quality 
at the rate of a song an hour, we could write it just as bad with a computing 
machine but faster.”1  Much faster, as it turned out.  A Datatron could write four 
thousand songs an hour.2  The only problem that Klein and Bolitho encountered in 
their digital composing project was that the Copyright Office refused registration 
for “Push Button Bertha,” one of Datatron’s many compositions.  The reason the 
Office gave at the time was that no one had ever before tried to register a piece of 
music written by a machine.  The rejection, for which the Office didn’t offer—and 
couldn’t have offered—any statutory basis, revealed a deep-seated if unspoken 
assumption that authors are necessarily human.3  
Klein’s article in Radio Electronics Magazine featured a flowchart of the 
Datatron’s composing process.4  The program employed six rules:  three were 
 derived from a study of a year’s worth of top 100 songs from Variety magazine; 
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 1. Martin L. Klein, Syncopation in Automation, RADIO-ELECTRONICS, June 1957, at 36. 
 2. Id. 
 3. By 1973, which brought publication of the first Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office 
Practices, that assumption had become explicit.  See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES (FIRST) § 2.8.3 (1st ed. 1973) (stating that works are not copyrightable if 
they do not “owe their origin to a human agent”). 
 4. Id. 
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the other three came from Mozart’s rules for writing melodies.  The first note 
chosen by the program corresponded to a number from zero through nine on a 
random number table.  If the chosen note satisfied all six rules, it was retained in 
the computer’s memory; subsequent notes were also chosen randomly and then 
tested against the rules.  The program continued to choose, test, and store notes 
until a composition that satisfied all of the rules was completed.  The algorithm was 
obviously rudimentary, but it was early proof of concept for generative code, and it 
marked the beginning of a computer music movement that would reach a peak 
decades later in the work of programmer-musicians like David Cope.5   
In 1965, Register of Copyrights Abraham Kaminstein identified the question of 
computer authorship as one of three major problems confronting the Copyright 
Office.6  A number of people filed copyright registrations that year for works at 
least partly authored by computers, and the Office found itself at a loss for how to 
deal with the situation.  Fast forward to 1974:  With the computer revolution 
gaining momentum, Congress created the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to study the intersection of 
copyright law and new technologies.  Among the specific topics CONTU was 
asked to study was the creation of new works with computer assistance. 
When CONTU published its Final Report in 1978, it recommended that no 
changes be made to existing copyright law to accommodate new works created 
with computers.7  The Commission raised and quickly dismissed the possibility that 
works could be created independently by computers.  It concluded three things:  
that computers were nothing more than inert tools of creation, that the development 
of artificial intelligence was too speculative to worry about, and that there was no 
reasonable basis for concluding that a computer in any way contributes authorship 
to a work produced through its use.8 
In 1986, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) revisited 
the question of computer authorship.9  The OTA’s report was critical of CONTU’s 
conclusion that computers are inert tools of creation like cameras or typewriters.10  
The report emphasized the increasing sophistication of computer programs and the 
interactive nature of computing, raising the possibility that computers in some 
 
 5. In the 1980s, Cope’s EMI (Experiments in Musical Intelligence) program produced complex 
and aurally convincing compositions in the style of classical composers like Mozart and Chopin.  See 
DAVID COPE, VIRTUAL MUSIC: COMPUTER SYNTHESIS OF MUSICAL STYLE 93–108 (2001). 
 6. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REP. OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 4 
(1966) (“The Copyright Office was confronted with three major problems during the fiscal year as a 
result of the constantly expanding development and use of computers: registration for computer 
programs, computer authorship, and automation in the Copyright Office.”). 
 7. NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 
44 (1978), http://eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED160122.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ASG-HNDF]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF 
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION (1986), https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1986/8610/8610.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/RN5U-HY3H]. 
 10. Id. at 72. 
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instances should be regarded as co-creators.11 
While it’s true that robots don’t yet run the world, computer systems dedicated 
to particular tasks have continued to get smarter and more independent over time.  
Some of these systems are designed to produce works that fall under the rubric of 
algorithmic or generative art.  Practitioners of generative art take a systems-
approach to artistic production, removing their own personalities from the creative 
process and ceding control to self-executing algorithms.  Often, these artists 
employ computers to run their algorithms, but sometimes they don’t.  Sometimes 
they compose algorithmically by hand, challenging traditional constructs of artistic 
inspiration by highlighting the rule-bound nature of human creativity.  As Anne 
Balsamo has pointed out, the term “computer” was originally coined to describe 
human beings, an irony that many of us don’t appreciate.12  The first “computers” 
were actually female clerical workers who operated mechanical adding machines. 
In the realm of popular culture, procedural generation techniques are being used 
more and more in the design of computer games.13  These techniques promise the 
development of the endless game, where the user never runs out of levels to 
complete or terrain to explore because the game itself is generating new content as 
it’s being played.  In the generative art domain, an AI program called AARON 
provides a good basis for discussing the problems and possibilities associated with 
computer authorship.  AARON’s underlying code was written by Harold Cohen 
beginning in 1973. Cohen, an art professor at the University of California, San 
Diego, spent the next thirty years of his career refining AARON’s code and 
basically “teaching” AARON about color, representation, and form.14  AARON’s 
works, which are generated autonomously by Cohen’s program, have been 
exhibited in galleries around the world and are on permanent display at the 
Computer [History] Museum in Boston.15  As Cohen  revised AARON’s code over 
time,  AARON’s output evolved stylistically from representation to abstraction—
the type of developmental arc that one might expect of a human artist.  Indeed, it 
was Cohen, through AARON’s changing code, who redefined the outer bounds of 
AARON’s artistic capacity. 
There’s certainly no question that Harold Cohen is the author of AARON’s code 
and that AARON’s code is copyrightable as a literary work.16  That’s a completely 
 
 11. Id. at 70. 
 12. ANNE BALSAMO, TECHNOLOGIES OF THE GENDERED BODY: READING CYBORG WOMEN 
(Duke Univ. Press 1995); see OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
37975?redirectedFrom=computer#eid [perma.cc/Z2KU-ZVTC] (last visited Jan. 26, 2016) (defining 
“computer” as “a person who makes calculations or computations; a calculator, a reckoner; spec. a 
person employed to make calculations in an observatory, in surveying, etc.”). 
 13. See KUMAR ASHOK, ALGORITHMIC AND ARCHITECTURAL GAMING DESIGN:  
IMPLEMENTATION AND DEVELOPMENT 24 (2012) (explaining the increasing complexity of computer-
generated aspects in games today). 
 14. See, e.g., STUART MEALING, COMPUTERS AND ART 34–37 (2002); PAMELA MCCORDUCK, 
AARON’S CODE: META-ART, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND THE WORK OF HAROLD COHEN (1991). 
 15. LINDA CANDY & ERNEST EDMONDS, EXPLORATIONS IN ART AND TECHNOLOGY 270 (2012). 
 16. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(holding that the source and object code of computer programs are copyrightable literary works). 
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uncontroversial copyright proposition.  But is Cohen also properly regarded as the 
author of AARON’s paintings?  He doesn’t lift a finger to create them, after all, and 
he can’t even predict precisely what they’ll look like.  In copyright terms, he 
doesn’t “fix” the works in a tangible medium of expression, and the act of fixation, 
as we know, is one defining attribute of authorship under the Copyright Act.17  Can 
we say that AARON’s code is the author of AARON’s paintings?  If so, what does 
that mean for their copyrightability? 
As we’ve heard already this morning, who or what can be an author for purposes 
of the Copyright Act is ultimately a constitutional question.  Congress has 
constitutional authority to create exclusive rights in the writings of authors.18  And 
historically, courts have construed these words liberally, but always with reference 
to human genius or intellect.  Going back to the early cases, we get the image of the 
author as maker or originator in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.19  In 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the author is figured as the embodiment 
of a unique personality that mystically passes into a work as it is created.20 
Our contemporary law of authorship comes from the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.21  Under Feist, a 
protectable work has to be original in the sense that it’s not copied and has to show 
some creative spark, whatever that means.22  Maybe creativity in copyright law is 
like obscenity in First Amendment law—hard to define precisely but you know it 
when you see it.  As Michael Madison has argued, “Feist represents the apotheosis 
of copyright law as creativity law.”23  The definition of creativity is critical, then, to 
the question of copyright for computer-created works.  If we define creativity as a 
quintessentially human faculty, then computers can never be authors, and we can 
basically stop there.  But if we define creativity alternatively as a set of traits or 
behaviors, then maybe creativity can be coded. 
One critique of artificial intelligence going back to the days of Charles 
Babbage’s Analytical Engine is that computers don’t originate anything; they just 
follow orders.24  As Babbage’s collaborator Lady Ada Lovelace famously said, 
“The analytical engine has no pretensions whatever to originate anything.  It can do 
only whatever we know how to order it to perform.”25  In Lovelace’s formulation, 
 
 17. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) (“As a general rule, 
the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a 
fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.”). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 19. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 20. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
 21. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 22. Id. at 363 (“This time-honored tradition does not possess the minimal creative spark required 
by the Copyright Act and the Constitution.”). 
 23. Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 817, 829 (2010). 
 24. Computer History Museum, “The Babbage Engine” (last visited Mar. 9, 2016), http://
www.computerhistory.org/babbage/engines/ [https://perma.cc/GC7G-9SU9]. 
 25. Richard Taylor, Note G., in SCIENTIFIC MEMOIRS, SELECTED FROM THE TRANSACTIONS OF 
FOREIGN ACADEMIES OF SCIENCE AND LEARNED SOCIETIES, AND FROM FOREIGN JOURNALS 722 (1837). 
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creativity is implicitly defined as the ability to do the unexpected or to deviate from 
rules.  Some people think computers can do this if their code incorporates elements 
of randomness, so that they make choices about composition that are governed at 
least in part by chance.  This is the position that computer scientist David Levy 
takes in Robots Unlimited.26 
Interestingly, AI researchers tend to set a higher bar for creativity than the 
Supreme Court set in Feist.  They define creativity in ways that invoke the patent 
law standards of novelty and usefulness.  For Margaret Boden, creativity is the 
ability to come up with ideas or artifacts that are new, surprising, and valuable.27  
Roger Schank and Christopher Owens define it as the ability to use an object, 
technique, or tool to solve a problem in a useful and previously undiscovered 
way.28  These definitions resonate more with patent’s high standards for inventors 
than they do with the low standard for authors announced in Feist.29 
When AI researchers approach the challenge of making computers creative, they 
avoid getting bogged down in philosophical debates about the nature of creativity.  
They focus instead on programming computers to make things that pass for 
creative, artifacts that people recognize as songs or paintings or poems.  It’s a sort 
of Turing Test for creativity.  If you can’t tell the difference between a painting by 
AARON and a painting by a human, then we can say that AARON’s painting 
exhibits creativity.  We might not say that AARON is creative, but we can say that 
AARON’s painting exhibits creativity. 
But does copyright law require human creativity?  The Copyright Act doesn’t 
say anywhere that an author has to human, and there’s really no case law directly 
on point.30  Nevertheless, there seems to be an assumption, maybe driven by 
practical and historical considerations, that authorship means human authorship.31  
The 1965 Register of Copyrights Annual Report frames the question precisely in 
terms of the human-computer divide.32  If a human creates a work, it’s 
copyrightable.  If a machine creates it, then it’s not.  The CONTU report does the 
same thing: unless there’s minimal human creative effort, there’s no protection.33  
 
 26. DAVID LEVY, ROBOTS UNLIMITED:  LIFE IN A VIRTUAL AGE (2005). 
 27. MARGARET BODEN, THE CREATIVE MIND: MYTHS AND MECHANISMS (2004). 
 28. Roger Schank & Christopher Owens, The Mechanics of Creativity, in THE AGE OF 
INTELLIGENT MACHINES 395 (Raymond Kurzweil ed., 1991). 
 29. See 35 USC §§ 101–103 (setting forth the standards for patentability). 
 30. After these remarks were delivered, while this article was in the editorial process, a federal 
district court ruled in the now-famous “monkey selfie” case that “the Copyright Act does not ‘plainly’ 
extend the concept of authorship or statutory standing to animals” and that animals cannot be authors for 
purposes of copyright law.  Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 28, 2016). 
 31. See id. (finding an implied rule in the fact that “[t]he Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have 
repeatedly referred to ‘persons’ or ‘human beings’ when analyzing authorship under the Act”). 
 32. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, SIXTY-EIGHT ANNUAL REP. OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 5 
(1966) (“The crucial question appears to be whether the ‘work’ is basically one of human authorship, 
with the computer merely being an assisting instrument, or whether the traditional elements of 
authorship in the work (literary, artistic, or musical expression or elements of selection, arrangement, 
etc.) were actually conceived and executed not by man but by a machine.”). 
 33. NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 
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The OTA report, a little bit later in time, dodges the question:  we know that these 
works would be copyrightable if they were done by people, but we don’t know 
what to do with them if they’re done by computers.34 
Although there are no cases directly on point, there are a number of really 
peculiar cases that deal with text putatively authored by divine or extraterrestrial 
beings, writing through a human medium or amanuensis.35  Invariably the courts in 
these cases have held that the work in question has to be attributed to a human 
author.36  Confronted with two litigants, both of whom take for granted that the 
work in question is copyrightable, courts in these cases tend to decide that the 
author and owner of the copyright is whoever actually wrote the work down, 
defaulting to the principle that fixation is a reliable indicator of authorship.37 
What the anthropocentric view of authorship elides, however, is that copyright 
law already accommodates a notion of non-human authors; they’re called 
corporations.  Under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, which is a legal fiction, a 
corporate employer is considered the legal author of a work of which it is not the 
author-in-fact.38  The statute could have been written to create an assignment by 
operation of law from an employee-author to her corporate employer, thus 
maintaining in principle a human monopoly on authorship, but it wasn’t.  It was 
written to allow a corporate employer to be treated ab initio as the author of a work 
created by its human employee. 
Because we already have a copyright doctrine that accommodates non-human 
authors, maybe that’s a logical place to look for a solution to the problem of 
computer authors.  Maybe we can treat computer-authored works as works made 
for hire.  This solution has, I think, two virtues:  First, it allows us to avoid what I 
think is a category mistake of treating the programmer as the author-in-fact of 
works that are actually composed by code.  Second, it avoids the problem of 
vesting legal rights in a machine, which we all know is impracticable. 
New Zealand essentially takes this approach.  Its copyright law expressly 
defines and protects computer-generated works and vests ownership of copyright in 
the “person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are 
undertaken.”39  Other common law countries—for example, the United Kingdom, 
Hong Kong, and India—take the same approach.40  Maybe not surprisingly, civil 
 
111 (1978), http://eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED160122.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ASG-HNDF]. 
 34. U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF 
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 69 (1986), https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1986/8610/
8610.PDF [https://perma.cc/XUV3-E979]. 
 35. See, e.g., Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd., No. 96 
Civ. 4126, 2000 WL 1028634 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000).  For a full discussion of the “psychographic 
work” cases, see Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 
2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 18–20 (2012). 
 36. Penguin Books, 2000 WL 1028634 . 
 37. Id. at *14. 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work made for hire”). 
 39. Copyright Act 1994 cl 5(2)(a) (N.Z.), http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1994/0143/
latest/DLM345899.html [https://perma.cc/8NCF-567P]. 
 40. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 1, § 9(3) (U.K.); Copyright Ordinance, 
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law countries with a strong moral rights orientation in their copyright systems—for 
example, France, Germany, Greece, Switzerland, and Hungary—reject the notion 
of non-human authorship completely.41 
I’ll close by saying that because U.S. copyright law is grounded in the protection 
of economic rather than moral rights, it’s not inconsistent with first principles to 
recognize authorship in non-natural persons.  Congress could amend the definition 
of work made for hire in section 101 to include works prepared autonomously by 
computers, and I don’t think that would be terribly alien to or inconsistent with the 
existing structure of the work made for hire doctrine.  There may be policy reasons 
not to proliferate copyrights in this way, but as a doctrinal matter it wouldn’t be 
beyond the pale.  Thanks. 
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 41. See CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] art. L113 (Fr); 
URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [UrhG] [COPYRIGHT ACT], Sept. 9, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI] 1 at 
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1993, A:25 (Greece); LOI FÉDÉRALE DU 9 OCTOBRE 1992 SUR LE DROIT D’AUTEUR ET LES DROITS 
VOISINS [LDA] [FEDERAL LAW OF OCTOBER 9, 1992 ON COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS] Oct. 
9, 1992, SR 231.1 (Switz.); 1999. évi LXXVI. szerzői jogról szóló (Act No. LXXVI of 1999 on 
Copyright) (Hung.). 
